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Abstract—Securing multicast communications in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs) is considered among the most challenging 
research directions in the areas of wireless networking and 
security. MANETs are emerging as the desired environment for 
an increasing number of commercial and military applications, 
addressing also a growing number of users. Security on the other 
hand, is now an indispensable requirement for these applications. 
However, the limitations of the dynamic, infrastructure-less 
nature of MANETs impose major difficulties in establishing a 
secure framework suitable for such services. The design of 
efficient key management (KM) schemes for MANET is of 
paramount importance, since the performance of the KM 
functions imposes an upper limit on the efficiency and scalability 
of the whole secure group communication system.  
   In this work, we contribute towards efficient and robust secure 
group communications for MANETs by extending the TGDH 
protocol to a novel distributed and topology aware scheme: DS-
TGDH. Our aim is to modify TGDH to: a) be feasible in the most 
general resource-constrained flat MANET where no nodes with 
special capabilities exist, b) produce considerably lower overhead 
for the network nodes involved, c) handle disruptions with low 
cost.  We consider the underlying routing protocol in our design, 
and we apply a distributed TGDH version over a robust 
schedule, optimizing parameters of interest. We focus on the 
design and analysis of the “stealthy” TGDH and compare it with 
the original, w.r.t. this cross-layer consideration. Through our 
analysis and results we shed more insight on the actual feasibility 
of these protocols for MANETs and provide more realistic and 
fair comparison results that more accurately advocate the pros 
and cons of each protocol over the environment of study. 
I. INTRODUCTION
 Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of 
wireless mobile nodes, communicating among 
themselves over possibly multi-hop paths, without the 
help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access 
points. As the development of wireless multicast services such 
as cable TV, secure audio and conferencing, military 
command and control grows, the research on security for 
wireless multicast becomes increasingly important. The role of 
key management (KM) is to ensure that only valid members 
have access to a valid group key at any time. So, the existence 
of a secure, robust KM scheme for multicast communications 
is essential. However, the characteristics of MANETs 
constitute the major constraint and challenge for the design of 
suitable KM schemes. We are dealing with dynamic, 
infrastructure-less networks of limited bandwidth, unreliable 
channels, where topology is changing fast. Network nodes 
may have limited capacity, computational and transmission 
power. Connections are temporary (mobility, battery drainage) 
and unreliable. These constraints render most of the existing 
KM schemes inefficient in MANETs: among other 
requirements, they need to catch up with a rapidly changing 
network topology, and handle failures at any time during 
group key establishment.  
   Along with the requirement to design secure KM schemes 
that achieve better performance than existing ones (either for 
wire-line or wireless networks), the need for the KM schemes 
to handle successfully and tolerate with low impact network 
dynamics and failures (robustness) in a network with large 
number of nodes (scalability) is now equally important. 
   In an attempt to meet all these objectives, two novel hybrid 
Octopus schemes MO and MOT [6, 19] were previously 
introduced and evaluated in addition to the original [1]. The 
special features of Octopus schemes have motivated our 
interest to explore and extend them. Hierarchy is supported 
through the partition of a large key agreement (KA) group to 
2d subgroups of smaller size. Initially, each subgroup agrees 
on its own subgroup key locally. Then, the subgroup leaders 
interact among themselves and use the previously generated 
subgroup keys to agree on a global group key via a core KA 
protocol, Hypercube [5]. Finally, the subgroup leaders 
distribute securely the group key to their subgroups. The 
superiority of MOT has been mainly attributed to the 
application of TGDH within the subgroup.  
  The primary focus of prior work was the analysis of the 
proposed schemes, based on the overhead resulting from the 
processing and exchange of KM information only. That was 
done in isolation from underlying backbone or auxiliary 
network functions (i.e. routing, clustering, leader election). 
However, since each of the schemes considered relies upon 
the former functions more or less, or in a different way, our 
previous evaluation is not totally fair. The consideration of 
network parameters that can accentuate their individual 
characteristics and the differences in their performance will 
provide more realistic results. For example, the hierarchical 
framework on top of which the three schemes are executed is 
supported by a clustering mechanism. Although the cost of 
adding and maintaining this framework adds to the overall 
cost of each individual scheme, it does not alter the outcome 
of the comparative evaluation of the schemes. On the contrary, 
the leader election and the backbone transmission schedule 
within the subgroup differ. For example, scheduling is not 
required for the subgroup in the centralized (O), in contrast to 
MO and MOT that members interact among themselves for 
the subgroup key generation. A simple schedule based 
arbitrarily on members’ IDs is likely to result in unnecessary 
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routing. Our main objective is lowering the overall bandwidth 
in the frameworks we design.  
  The need to apply the subgroup schemes in MO and MOT 
(GDH.2 and TGDH) over a schedule that optimizes metrics of 
interest comes into the play. The network assumptions made 
in TGDH [4], (e.g. leader reaches all members via a single 
broadcast), are too simplistic to apply to a general MANET. 
This way, the need to integrate the discussed functions in their 
design is mitigated. In real multi-hop networks, a cross-layer 
consideration appears to be essential for a concrete KM 
framework. Previous results have designated MOT as the 
most efficient for the environment discussed. It would be 
worth exploring if MOT still prevails after a re-evaluation of 
the same schemes under more realistic network assumptions. 
   In the present work, we assume that a path between group 
members may as well include non-member relays. We simply 
rely on the redundancy of the routing protocol to ensure that 
the exchanged messages are delivered in a timely manner. 
Dividing such group into subgroups, each one corresponding 
to a fully connected graph of members, reachable by the 
subgroup leader via a single broadcast, would permit the 
execution of the original “centralized” TGDH exactly under 
the assumptions described in [4]. This approach is impractical 
for a large group: a high number of subgroups will be formed, 
very sensitive to even subtle mobility changes, and it is quite 
likely that they will contain very few members, even a single 
one. Even if such subgroups are in very close proximity they 
still cannot be merged. The result is a considerable waste in 
network resources, and an infeasible execution of Hypercube, 
where the crucial parameter d is likely to be high and unstable. 
Then, the resulting inter-cluster signaling overhead outweighs 
the benefits of Hypercube for the inter-cluster communication. 
   In this paper we present an adaptation of TGDH to meet the 
requirements of a general MANET. In particular, we modify 
TGDH so that: a) it is made distributed, no single point of 
failure leader is required, b) it is executed under a schedule 
that optimizes our own defined routing and robustness 
metrics, under a cross-layer, topologically aware 
consideration, c) it tolerates failures and disruptions with low 
cost, d) it is far more efficient w.r.t. bandwidth and 
computation overhead. We denote this novel scheme as DS-
TGDH (Distributed TGDH with Schedule) and evaluate both 
protocols under the new assumptions. Section 2 gives an 
overview of related work. Section 3 provides an overview of 
TGDH. Section 4 discusses fault-tolerance issues for our 
framework. In section 5 we introduce DS-TGDH, in section 6 
we analyze its initial and steady state operations. Section 7, 8 
present the analytical comparative performance evaluation and 
the corresponding simulation results. Finally, in section 9 we 
conclude the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK
The KM proposals for secure group communications abound 
in the literature. From the perspective of contributory
protocols (equal member contributions for the group key 
generation), Becker et al. [1], derived lower bounds for 
contributory key generation systems for the gossip problem 
and proved them realistic for Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocols. 
They used the basic DH distribution extended to groups from 
the work of Steiner [2]. GDH.2 is the most efficient 
representative of such schemes: it minimizes the total number 
of message exchanges. TGDH by Kim et al. [10], is a hybrid, 
efficient protocol that blends binary key trees with 2-party DH 
key exchanges. Becker in [1], introduced Hypercube that 
requires a minimum number of rounds, and in [5], Asokan 
added limited fault-tolerant extensions. Becker introduced 
Octopus that requires minimum number of messages and then 
2d-Octopus that combined Octopus with Hypercube to a very 
efficient scheme that works for arbitrary nodes.  
   Centralized (non-contributory) protocols are based on a 
simple key distribution center. The most fundamental 
representative is GKMP [9], in which a group leader shares a 
secret key with each member and uses it to communicate the 
group key to the associated member. The original Octopus 
uses a GKMP version within each subgroup. LKH [8], creates 
a hierarchy of keys for each group member. Each group 
member is secretly given one of the keys at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and can decrypt the keys along its path from to the 
root. Evolution of the latter are: ELK [21], designed rather for 
a stationary network, and OFT [7] that minimizes the number 
of bits broadcast to members after a membership change.  
   Some more recent proposals exist for wireless ad-hoc 
networks. Even these schemes, do not seem to scale well or 
handle successfully the network dynamics. Some of these 
approaches rely on public key cryptography, which is very 
expensive for resource constrained nodes, or on threshold 
cryptography [14, 15, 16, 22], which results in high bandwidth, 
does not scale well, and presents security vulnerabilities, 
mainly due to the mobility of nodes. A different approach is 
based on probabilistic key pre-distribution [17, 18], which is a 
very lightweight method, designed for sensor networks, but 
has serious vulnerabilities, and requires some basic 
infrastructure to handle mobility and membership changes 
(revocations). Amir et al. [12, 13], focus on robust KA to 
make GDH protocols fault-tolerant to asynchronous network 
events. However, their scheme designed for the Internet, and 
requires an underlying reliable group communication service 
and ordering of messages, so that preservation of virtual 
semantics is guaranteed. Poovendran et al. [11], attempt to 
minimize the bandwidth for secure group communications 
w.r.t. to energy expenditure. They utilize centralized tree key 
distribution schemes. The network topology is considered 
static, and there is no provision for adjusting the key tree 
structure to a dynamically changing network. The optimal 
solution of their formulation does not scale with group size.  
  In [6, 19, 20], Octopus-based KA protocols have been 
designed to provide robust and efficient KM for group 
communications in MANETs. The primary focus of this work 
was the analysis and performance evaluation of the proposed 
schemes, in isolation from network functions that interact with 
the protocols (e.g. underlying routing).  
III. TGDH OVERVIEW AND COST EVALUATION
The original TGDH is well documented in [2] and [4]. Here, 
we simply address its key points. Also, a detailed analysis on 
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how the associated costs are derived, wherever it has been 
omitted in [2], [4], can be found in our TR [6]. 
Overview: Authors in [10] use 2-party DHKEs to compute a 
binary tree of keys (height h=log2n) from the leaves to the 
root. Each of the n members is associated with a leaf in the 
tree. Each tree node x is associated with two cryptographic 
keys, the un-blinded kx and the blinded key (BK) kx’ = g(kx),
where g is the 2-party DH function. Interior keys are defined 
by the rule: kx = ( ) ( )( ( ), ( ))left x right xg g k g k . The key associated
with the root serves as the group key. Each member knows 
only the un-blinded node keys on its path to the root, and the 
BKs of the siblings of the nodes on the same path (co-path). 
These BKs are sent by the leader. The authors however, for 
redundancy reasons, assume that the leader communicates all 
BKs to all members. The member computes the un-blinded 
keys along its path to the root. If one of the BKs changes and 
the member gets the new value, it re-computes the keys on the 
path and finds the new group key. The new values of the BKs 
that have changed are broadcast by the sponsor to all members 
(h broadcasts and 2×h exponentiations are required for the 
sponsor, and between 1 to h exponentiations for the members, 
since not all BKs change for them). For the case of the initial 
tree formation, the total number of messages broadcast by the 





≤ 2n, and the exponentiations are 4n for 
the sponsor and h for the member. In the case of membership 
updates, the sponsor creates a new secret key for itself. In the 
addition case, it gets the BK of the new member and updates 
the corresponding path. The new member gets all n BKs.
IV. FAULT-TOLERANT EXTENSION OF TGDH
We wish to design a distributed, efficient transmission
schedule algorithm on top of which TGDH can be executed, 
so that the corresponding communication and routing 
overhead are reduced. The pre-agreed, ID-based schedule of 
TGDH members is in fact the key generation algorithm, and 
does not deal with communication regulation. That would be 
redundant since all the messaging goes through the sponsor. 
The BK of each member at a given tree level is unicast to the 
sponsor who waits to collect all BKs of the same level and 
then combines them to a single broadcast to all the rest of 
members. This broadcast message signals the advancement in 
the tree level. Each member is now able to compute the 
designated secret value for the next level. It then blinds it and 
unicasts it to the sponsor. The same process is repeated for all 
levels upwards the tree until the root is reached. Hence, any 
two members communicate with each other via the sponsor. 
With this scheme, KA is executed in a centralized manner.
  TGDH may perform as claimed in [10] under the constraints 
of a limited network where any member is able to reach all 
group members with 1-hop and where the sponsor acquires 
extra bandwidth and power capabilities. Such a scenario does 
not reflect the general MANET case, so the resulting 
performance metrics are not realistic. The most significant 
drawbacks of TGDH as presented in [10] are the following: 
(a) Any trusted member, with sufficient bandwidth and power 
capabilities should be ready to assume the duties of a leader. 
The most important constraint for MANETs is the existence 
of such node(s). What is more, members may not be able to 
reach the sponsor via a single transmission anyway. So, both 
directions may introduce excessive multi-hop routing. (b)
Simultaneous transmissions of BKs at any tree level to the 
sponsor through multi-hop routing in a limited network area 
may increase the probability of collisions at the MAC layer, 
and thus the probability of re-transmissions, deteriorating even 
more the performance of the scheme. (c) Power is considered 
valuable resource in MANETs, so it is undesirable for 
members to serve frequently as relays in heavy KM messages. 
Also, the sponsor is burdened with heavy tasks that consume 
its residual energy all too fast. (d) The sponsor still remains a 
single point of failure communication-wise. If it fails during 
key establishment, the protocol is stalled until a new leader 
emerges, and a number of BKs must be updated.  
  TGDH has some considerable advantages as well: (a) it is 
simple, no sophisticated scheduling is required, (b) failure of a 
member has no impact on the execution of the protocol other 
than the update of a logarithmic number of BKs, (c) every 
member knows the BKs of all subgroup members and can 
proactively anticipate dynamic membership changes that 
would result in the need to reconfigure the key generation 
algorithm and restore the group key with minimal latency.  
   Considering the pros and cons of TGDH, we present a more 
efficient, distributed version that uses a transmission schedule 
algorithm to mitigate the weak points of the above approach.
V. DS-TGDH OVERVIEW
A.  Transmission Schedule for DS-TGDH
  The sponsor initially collects through members’ registration 
and link state information, all the required information about 
its subgroup members. We assume a generic underlying 
routing protocol with the property that it always finds the 
minimum path (i.e. Dijkstra). It provides all nodes with the 
paths to at least the nearest subgroup members (w.r.t. the 
number of hops), and finds at least one path connecting two 
members, as long as both are within the same cluster. The 
upper limit in the number of hops between members 
considered immediate “logical one-hop neighbors” is 
dynamically set. Routing provides members with information 
about the robustness of the paths to “neighbors”. For 
example, if we know the motion parameters of two virtual 
neighbors (speed, direction, radio propagation range), and 
their coordinates, we can determine the duration of the time 
these two nodes will remain connected, denoted as Link 
Expiration Time (LET) [25]. The routing path r is 
characterized by the minimum among all LETs of its links, 
denoted as Route Expiration Time (RET). RET indicates the 
overall stability of a path: as soon as a single link on a path is 
disconnected, the entire path is invalidated, as argued in [25]. 
We as well choose RET as a component of our “path 
robustness metric”, generated and communicated to members.  
  We select the normalized product of the residual energies of 




∏  as an 
additional metric to characterize path robustness. In this case 
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we do not consider the minimum residual energy as a valid 
metric, because a node may participate to more than one 
routing paths. We rather choose to average the residual 
energies of nodes along the same routing path and we 
characterize the “robustness” of a routing path r by the value: 
Rr= a ×EN + β ×RET.
 The contribution of each different parameter towards the 
computation of Rr can be fine tuned through a and β .
Network nodes are equipped with GPS or other similar 
devices that allow the computation of their own position, and 
of distances among them as well. Member x maintains and 
updates a list Lx with cardinality |DMx|, that includes all the 
“virtual neighbors”, and the collected routing metrics for each.  
B. Execution Stage Overview
  A member j that belongs to the schedule tree T, selects one 
among the available routing paths at level (l-1) that leads to a 
member k∈Lj. Member j generates now the offspring <j, k>
for level l. Members j and k are connected with a logical link, 
one of low cost w.r.t. routing, and are considered siblings at 
level l. They update all members in their proximity (lists Lj,
Lk) of the new event (TreeFlag(k) is set to “busy” mode). 
Then, they individually proceed to generate offspring for the 
next level from the lists Lj and Lk. If another member r that did 
not receive the updates attempts to enlist member j or k in the 
tree they just “refuse” and r checks its remaining options. The 
virtual tree expands according to the following simple idea: 
The more robust the members, the higher in the tree they will 
be placed. A member j arranges Lj w.r.t. the metrics discussed 
and attempts to use these members in this order one by one as 
offspring (in successive levels), unless they are already “used” 
by other members. Whenever a leaf is reached (i.e. a path 
cannot be expanded anymore), all the information regarding 
the members that belong to the path traverses up the root. The 
root then can check if all members are included in the tree 
(optional). In fact, tree members need only know their 
immediate parent, grandparent (if any) and the parent’s first 
sibling, in addition to their own siblings. Member j gives 
priority to this “unselected neighbor” m that satisfies at least 
one of the following rules in the order they are stated: 
Rule#1) m∈{LJ ∩ LB /T}, where T is the current tree version,
and B is the parent (or first sibling) of j. By this rule, we want 
to ensure that if j becomes faulty then B can take its place in 
the tree, and become a sibling of all the previous siblings of j,
so that the impact of a failure is minimal (no need to prune the 
tree). To ensure that the selection of m at this stage ensures a 
relatively strong tree link also, we simultaneously impose that 
Rr (j,m)>Th, where Th is a threshold value. If there is more 
than one choice, the “shortest path” one is preferred. 
Rule#2) m∈{Lj / T}and rjm ≤ D, s.t. ∀ x∈{Lj / T}and rjx ≤ D:
Rr (j, m) > Rr (j, x). If rule 1 cannot apply, then rule#2 simply 
selects this member with the strongest link to j, among those 
with routing distance less than D hops. 
Scheme 1: TGDH schedule formation from arbitrary network graph
Below, we provide the pseudo-code for the offspring selection 
of member j, to better illustrate the process. 
Selection Stage for Member J – Parameters:  
Preparation Stage for J: Arrange all members y∈ LJ  w.r.t. :
a) Rr – in decreasing order and generate list RLJ.
b)  | r |  – in increasing order and generate list rLJ.
FirstSib(J)=K, Parent(J)=A, Sib(J)=L, Token(J)=1, TreeFlag(J)=1;
Set RLCMB = RLJ ∩ (LK ∪ LA), in the order of RLJ, and 
Set rLCMB = rLJ ∩ (LK ∪ LA), in the order of rLJ.
Set Rev1= LastElem (rLCMB), Rev2=LastElem(RLCMB);
Rule#1: search all y∈rLCMB /RLCMB for offspring
If (rLCMB ≠ ∅ )  { 
Exit = 0; NoFnd = 0;   y = GetNext (rLCMB );
while ( (!Exit ) | | (y ≠ ∅ ))  {
If (Status(TreeFlag(y)) == Unknown)  {
J ->y: RequestStatus(y); y -> J: GetTreeFlag(y);     } 
if ((TreeFlag (y)) {Update (LJ, RLCMB, rLCMB); // y already used
y = GetNext (rLCMB); if (y = ∅ ) NoFnd = 1;   }
// stop here, this is the min. path member fulfilling Rule1
if (!TreeFlag (y)) &&(Rr(J, y)>Th)) { FoundOpt = y; Exit=1; } 
// subopt. y∈rLCMB w/ min. path or max. robust < Th
if ((!TreeFlag (y)) && (Rr(J, y)<Th)) { 
if (rr(J, y)< rr(J, Rev1)) Rev1=y;  // only min path  
if (Rr(J, y)> Rr(J, Rev2)) Rev2=y; //  max. robust <Th 
 y=GetNext (rLCMB); if (y = ∅ )   NoFnd = 1;   }  } 
Rule#2: search all members y∈rLJ / RLJ for offspring
If ((rLCMB = ∅ ) | | (NoFnd)) {Exit=0; NoFnd=0;  y=GetNext (rLJ );
while ( (!Exit ) | | (y ≠ ∅ ))   { 
If (Status (TreeFlag(y)) == Unknown) {
J -> y: RequestStatus(y); y -> J: GetTreeFlag(y);    } 
if ((TreeFlag (y))   {  Update(LJ, RLCMB, rLCMB);
y = GetNext (rLJ);    if (y = ∅ )   NoFnd = 1; } 
if (!TreeFlag (y)) { 
if ((rr(J, y) < rr(J, R1)) && (Rr(J, y) > Th)) R1 = y;
if (Rr(J, y) > Rr(J, R2)) R2 = y; //  max. robustness 
 y = GetNext (rLJ);    Exit=1; }} 
// Process Results to Decide on Final Siblings 
If  Exist (FoundOpt) NewSibl(J)= FoundOpt;   else  { 
if  (NoFree(LJ)) Leaf(J, Status (J, L));  // J stops expanding
else NewSibl(J) = SubOpt_Select(R1,R2,Rev1,Rev2); }  } 
These rules ensure two basic requirements for robustness and 
efficiency: 1) Members with high risk of getting disconnected 
occupy the fewest possible internal nodes and are pushed 
towards the leaves. The impact of their “loss” is mitigated as 
much as possible when pruning the tree, 2) Members high in 
the tree are more likely to satisfy rule#1, since they have more 
available neighbors. Their failure would affect the schedule of 




















remedy such failures with minimum extra cost and latency. At 
the other extreme, failure of a member associated only with a 
leaf has no impact to the tree. So, a greedy strategy for the 
offspring selection appears to be the best to pursue. Members, 
at all times, attempt to use their best available options (w.r.t. 
robustness and routing), and keep pushing the “worst 
candidates” towards the leaves. Also, no member is now a 
single point of failure. Even if the root A fails, the idea is that 
its nearest former neighbor, e.g. node B, replaces A in the tree, 
and routing connects to B all nodes prior connected to A. It is 
very likely that these nodes remain relatively close to B as 
well. The other tree nodes remain unaffected.  
  Applying this algorithm on any network graph, does not 
necessarily result in a totally balanced transmission tree. This 
would be desirable if emphasis was placed upon fair resource 
allocation for building and maintaining a schedule. Our 
distributed approach indirectly achieves: a) a minimum delay 
schedule tree since members are enlisted in the tree in a first
come first served manner, and b) producing a relatively 
balanced tree, since at any level, all members are free to 
expand, if options are available. So, our approach resembles 
mainly of breadth-first instead of depth-first search algorithm. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF DS-TGDH
A. Initial DS-TGDH Schedule Evaluation. 
Member j does less than 2Lj comparisons of cost CCMP = O(1) 
each. When j is handed the token, it updates Lj of the status 
change in its flag (busy). While a member y is being tested 
during the selection process by member x, its flag is set to 
“lock”. Those that contact y in the mean time, cannot enlist it 
as long as its flag remains to “lock” mode. After the selection 
stage ends, x unlocks y’s flag by setting it either to: busy or 
free. The exchange of ACKs or Status data requires far lower 
number of bits (KS) than the key data (K). We obtain the DS-
TGDH computation cost CP, by summing all ramifications of 
the former algorithm under the worst case scenario. Hence,  
CP = Lj×(3CCMP×KS) (rule1) + Lj×(3CCMP×KS) (rule2) + 
(3CCMP×KS) (process_results) = (2Lj+1)×(3CCMP×KS).
B. Impact of Dynamic Events on the DS - TGDH Schedule. 
  We want to guarantee a transmission schedule that can 
anticipate dynamic or membership changes as well. From the 
security point of view, it is shown in [4, 8] how members’ 
evictions and additions are handled in TGDH to preserve the 
basic fundamental security properties that escort all secure 
KM protocols: Forward, Backward and Group key secrecy.
Here, we want to show in addition how to resume the TGDH 
schedule in the event of disruptions of any kind, with the 
minimum amount of extra overhead and latency, and ensure 
that the updated schedule is still functional and efficient.
B1. Eviction: 
  The virtual tree may need reconfiguration after the removal 
of a member. The idea behind the eviction algorithm is the 
following: either the parent A or the first sibling X of the 
evicted member B, substitute B in the tree path it appears. Let 
B be replaced by A. All former siblings of B must now become 
A’s siblings. For members x∈(LB/LA), routing finds the 
shortest paths to A, and they are all added to LA. Compared to 
the rest of B’s former siblings, A or X are either more robust or 
lie closer to B. It is thus quite likely that some of B’s former 
siblings: a) already belong to LA or LX, and the routing needs 
not generate extra paths and b) do not belong to LA or LX, but 
the paths to be formed are relatively short, since both ends lie 
in the proximity of the evicted B. These statements are quite 
likely to hold if the network is relatively dense. Under this 
simple approach, we reconfigure the tree with little latency 
and we expect that the new schedule does not result in 
considerable extra overhead.
  The decision of which member will substitute B, is assigned 
to the last sibling chosen by B, denoted as L. L is the least 
preferred from the point of view of robustness and path length 
among the remaining available “neighbors” of B placed in the 
tree. All previous selections are considered more stable. The 
routing finds the shortest paths from L to both X and A. The 
shortest one, with robustness is no worse than some threshold, 
designates which member will substitute B. The reason behind 
this is that we want the substitute member to accommodate all 
affected members with low overhead, ensuring as high 
robustness as possible. It is more likely that the best selection 
for the least robust sibling is also the best for the rest of them. 
We could also find the shortest paths to X and A for all 
siblings, and select the one that accommodates best the 
majority. The resulting overhead and required coordination, 
make this solution impractical for the environment of study.  
Scheme2: Illustration of schedule maintenance after B’s failure, 
when parent A = P(B) is selected to “replace” B.
Eviction of Member B: - Parameters:
P(B)=A, OFirst(B)=X, OLast(B)=L, Offspring(B)=[X, L];
// B’s last sibling examines two candidates ( A or X) to substitute B 
GetRtPath ((OLast(B), OFirst(B)); 
If (P(B) ≠ ∅ ))  GetRtPath ((OLast(B), P(B)); 
If (P(B) ≠ ∅ )) { if ((rr (OLast(B),P(B)) < rr (OLast(B),
OFirst(B)) && (|Rr((OLast(B),P(B)) - Rr(OLast(B), OFirst(B))
| < R ))  then P = P(OLast(B)) = P(B);
else P = P(OLast(B)) = OFirst(B);  } 
if  (P(B)= ∅ )) P = P(OLast(B)) = OFirst(B);
∀ y∈LB: if (P(y)= P)∉Ly  GetRtPath (P); Update(y);
B2. Addition: 
The routing finds the shortest paths from the new member T to 
members in the proximity, and list LT is created. T will be 
added as a leaf to this member in LT to which it is connected 
via the minimum number of hops and fulfills a robustness 
criterion at the same time. A modification of rule1 is used to 
select the best solutions. Initially, T looks for a member B s.t. 
B, Parent(B)∈rLT. This is necessary to make the tree robust 
to failures as discussed. If Rr(T,B)>R and Rr (T,Parent(B))>R,
the solution is optimal, else if only Rr(T,B)>R, it is considered 
suboptimal. If none of the above is true, we apply a version of 














with which they share the minimum hop path rr(T, J), for 
which robustness is among the highest in LT. Then, J expands 
one level and becomes the parent and the first sibling of T.
Add Member T to Subgroup 
Exit=0; FoundOpt=0; FoundSOpt=0; Set Rr(T, SOpt)=0;
Set Rev1=rLT[Last]; y = GetNext (rLT);
∀ y ∈rLT  do:  while ( (!Exit ) | | (y ≠ ∅ ))  { 
// Optimal Solution – Rule1 
if ((P(y)∈rLT )&&(Rr(T, y)>R)&&(Rr(T, P(y))>R))
{ Opt=y;  FoundOpt=1; Exit=1;  } 
// SubOpt. Solution – Rule1
if ((P(y)∈rLT)&&(Rr(T, y)>R)&&(Rr(T, P(y))<R))
{ FoundSOpt=1;   if (Rr(T, y) >Rr(T, SOpt) ) SOpt= y;  } 
//SubOpt.(Rule2)-Select y w/ min. path &threshold robustness
else if ((Rr(T, RLT[1]) - Rr(T, y)) < Th)  { 
 if (rr(T, y)< rr(T, Rev1)) Rev1= y;   } y = GetNext (rLT); } 
// Process results: 
if (FoundOpt) { P[T]=Opt, FSibl[T]=Opt;  };
else if (FoundSOpt) {P[T]=SOpt, FSibl[T]= SOpt;}
else { P[T]= Rev1, FSibl[T]= Rev1; }
C. Analytical Evaluation of Dynamic Events on DS-TGDH. 
Eviction/Failure: Let L be the last selected sibling of B. L
does only two comparisons to determine which candidate will 
replace B. Let A be replacing B. Former B’s siblings, hB, that 
do not already acquire paths to A, use routing to obtain such 
paths and the associated metric values. However, hB<|LB|,
since a subset of LB has been prior reserved by other tree 
members. Also, any j∉LA is likely to have been enlisted by B
towards the end of its path. Let NE denote the average number 
of members that computes such paths. It can be shown that 
NE ≈ hB/2. The proof is omitted for lack of space.
Addition: About DMT shortest routing paths are discovered. 
The total computation cost CP for T is derived similarly to the 
eviction case under the worst case scenario. Hence:  
CP=LT×(4CCMP×KS)(rule1)+LT×(2CCMP×KS)(rule2)+
(2CCMP×KS) (process Results) = (3LT+1)×(2CCMP×KS) (bits).
If we impose a limit D on the length of the proximity lists, we 
obtain the following cost DS-TGDH formulae (per member): 
DS-TGDH Schedule Adj.Costs 
Deletion Comm/tion NE×KS (> hB /2) 
Deletion Computation 2CCMP×KS
Add Comm/tion   DMT×KS (<D paths) 
Add Computation (3D+1)× (2CCOMP×KS)
VII. DS-TGDH VS. TGDH ANALYTICAL EVALUATION
In TGDH, h rounds are required for the computation of the 
group key. By then, each member has communicated h×K bits 
to the sponsor, and has received a total of h×n×K bits, from 
which the useful information is contained only in h×K bits. 
This means that each routing path from the sponsor to any 
member carries (n-1)×K bits of “redundant” information per 
round, which makes the original proactive approach 
impractical. The total expected number of BKs exchanged is:  
E[BKS] = (n×h) [members] + (n2×h)  [sponsor]. 
In DS-TGDH, the number of pairs that interact in the initial 
case is reduced to half after each round. This operation is 
reflected in the way we have constructed the schedule tree. 
The total number of tree nodes is 2n. Hence, we have 2×n
communication exchanges of key parts over the designated 
routing paths. Any member must get the BKs of the members 
of its co-path. The member that participates actively at any 
step to the key generation knows all the required BKs up to 
this point. This is true if we consider how the schedule tree is 
built. If member A is active at step i, it has been active in all 
previous steps from the start of its path, and has collected and 
sent all the required BKs (1 per step). Let hUA denote the 
number of times A appears in the tree ( ≠ A’s path to the root, 
hA). During the upward phase, A uses hUA paths and sends a 
BK over each.  It does not send the BK obtained at one round 
right away to its descendants, but waits first to collect all the 
keys of the members in its co-path. So, the distribution of the 
required BKs follows a top-down approach. The number of 
BKs distributed from a parent A to offspring B is equal to the 
number of hops B is away from the root. So, A receives a 
message (hA - hUA)×K long and sends hUA BKs to its offpring: 
i.e. for offspring j, at level i, A sends (hA-i) BKs  (i ≤ hUA).
Members Receive:
BKs (A) = (hUA-1)UPWD + (hA – (hUA-1))DNWD = hA.
Routes Used RUR(A) = (hUA-1)UPWD  + 1DNWD = hUA.




































BKs (A,level i) = (hUA-1)UPWD + (hA – i)DNWD(i) = hUA +hA-1-i.
RUS(A) = (hUA -1)UPWD (1 BK/route) + (hUA -1)DNWD (hA-½ hUA)
BKs/route in average).











= hUA×hA – ½×hUA× (hUA-1) = hUA× (hA - ½ × (hUA -1)).































































    (3). 
The schedule tree is not necessarily balanced. Any arbitrary 
schedule tree can be derived from a balanced one of the same 
size, since the following observation is true: to extend a path 
in the balanced tree from h to h+1 (2 nodes are added – 
property of schedule tree), another path must be abbreviated 
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from h to h-1 (two nodes get eliminated). By induction, we 
see that for a path to be extended from height h to h+k, one or 
more other paths must be abbreviated by k hops totally. The 
average individual member participation in unbalanced trees 













=n×h,       (4), 
and the previous results of (1), (2), (3) can be revisited. 
(1), (2), (4) => E[RUR]= 1 2 (n×h), E[RUS] = 1 2 (n×h).


















where 2hσ is the path variance (expected to be low). Hence, 
E[BKS] = 38 (n×h2)+ 38 (n×
2
hσ ) + ¼ (n×h).
Total Comm. OH TGDH DS –TGDH 
BKs (per member) h, n2×h (h-½(½h-1))×½ h
BKeys Total (n×h) + (n2×h) 3
8 n(h
2+ 2hσ )+¼ n h
Rt. per member Use 
/Discover
use 1, n (spons), 
discovers any  
uses 2(hUA-1),
discovers 2D
Total Rt. Use/Disc. use n, discov.>n use 1 2 (n×h),
discover 2nD
Redundant Info hn(n-1)K total No
Table 3: Summary of analytical results of TGDH vs. DS-TGDH.
It is clear that DS-TGDH is substantially more efficient w.r.t. 
the overall communication, and as will be shown next via 
simulations, it achieves a much better routing performance.  
We have considered a very generic framework to apply and 
compare the two protocols. Since we assume that not all 
network nodes belong to the secure subgroup, using broadcast 
and flooding the network is inefficient. The use of multicast 
brings about several issues also: (a) the network and members 
configuration may be such that is not benefited from multicast 
(i.e. arbitrary relays), (b) underlying multicast should be 
optimized as well to improve the performance of a key 
generation scheme, and such a cross-layer consideration is 
additionally complex, (c) multicast may not be supported by 
all network nodes that are assumed heterogeneous in general.  
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR DS-TGDH, TGDH
i) Simulation Set-Up and Discussion:  
We have conducted a simulation analysis in order to compare 
the routing cost of DS-TGDH vs. TGDH. We use different 
graphs to generate the secure subgroups and analyze the 
performance of the two algorithms. Our network graph 
represents a single cluster area where a single subgroup is 
deployed. A number of nodes from this graph are randomly 
selected as subgroup members. We use two methods to select 
the subgroup leader: either randomly, or pick the member with 
the largest “member” degree. At the end of the subgroup 
“registration” period, the sponsor piggybacks the list of the 
legitimate members into the routing packets. Through the 
underlying routing, each member obtains the routing path(s) 
to its closest neighbor(s). We dynamically determine the 
proximity w.r.t. the number of hops between two members. If 
no neighbors are found in the proximity, the search diameter 
(TTL) is gradually expanded until a member is found.  
  We further assume that while the schedule tree is being 
formed, the relative placement of members and consequently 
the proximity lists do not change significantly. Such a change 
could result in a different “optimal” solution, and the one 
currently generated would become outdated and probably 
suboptimal. However, our algorithm is fairly fast. So, it is not 
too optimistic to assume that the topological changes that 
occur do not “offset” our solution much from the optimal. Of 
course, it is expected that the higher the mobility of nodes, the 
worse the performance of our algorithm is. Even though DS-
TGDH is more sensitive to mobility than TGDH, it can still 
reduce significantly the communication overhead. 
  For our evaluation, we generated various random graphs for 
a given input of the number of nodes n and the number of 
members m. For the same graph and the same input, we have 
varied the subgroup configuration, i.e., we have selected the m
members in a random manner. For each graph of input <n, m>
and subgroup configuration, we have evaluated the total 
routing cost of DS-TGDH vs.TGDH, and we have averaged 
the results for all random graphs with the same inputs <n, m>.
We have tested the following cluster-subgroup scenarios:  
Cluster Size: [100,…500],      Subgroup Size: [2,…60].  
ii) Simulation Results:
Below we illustrate some indicative results on the routing 
overhead produced by both DS-TGDH and TGDH, measured 
in number of hops (relays). The following graphs reflect the 
routing overhead produced from the key generation in both 
schemes. The KM messaging is very heavy for the network 
nodes, so our aim is to reduce the overall number of bits (or 
packets) required and relieve as many nodes as possible from 
“relaying” large keying data. Also, we wish to dynamically 
distribute the KM tasks of a single-point of failure leader to 
more or potentially all members. Indeed, DS-TGDH results in 
significant savings in terms of routing overhead, and in most 
cases the associated ratio is: ( )( )
DS TGDH RC
TGDH RC
− <0.3. The total 
savings from the use of DS-TGDH are even more significant 
if we consider also the amount of redundant keying data, as 
calculated in our analysis, relayed by nodes during every 
round of TGDH. To illustrate the above with an example, for 
a cluster of size 300, and a subgroup of size 35, the averaged 
relays produced are 457 for DS-TGDH, 2987 for TGDH. This 
means that the overall redundant data communicated via the 
relays is: 22987 2 34 log 34 1024× × ×  bits=311,986,170 bits. 
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Graph1: Total routing overhead computation for original TGDH vs. 
Decentralized TGDH w.r.t. Cluster Size, for Subgroup Size = 20. 
Graph2: Total routing overhead computation for original TGDH vs. 
Decentralized TGDH w.r.t. SubGroup Size, for Cluster Size = 300. 
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Graph3: Total routing overhead computation for original TGDH vs. 
Decentralized TGDH w.r.t. Cluster Size, for Subgroup Size = 45 
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the design of a decentralized, low cost 
Fault-Tolerant version of TGDH, denoted as DS-TGDH for a 
general MANET. DS-TGDH benefits from a cross-layer 
consideration of the underlying routing and the existing 
logical TGDH key generation framework to enhance the 
performance and behavior of the original ancestor scheme. 
We present a topology aware schedule on top of which DS-
TGDH is executed, and we analytically evaluate the overhead 
of the schedule generation and execution, for the initial and 
the steady state (under the presence of membership changes 
and disruptions). Exploring the potential of DS-TGDH 
through different views (communication, routing, processing 
overhead), we attempt to provide accurate and spherical 
evaluation and understanding of both algorithms, and of their 
strong and weak assets. Through our analytical work and 
simulation results we show how we can achieve better 
performance in the environment of interest, with our scheme.  
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